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Abstract: Large-scale mining has become the cornerstone of Mongolia’s 
development and poverty reduction narrative. Building on political economy 
insights, this paper explores the politics of artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) 
in the competing context of the fast-pace development of large-scale mining in 
Mongolia. Questions are raised about the actors involved in promoting an 
‘investment-led model’ which has privileged large-scale activities. Such context 
sheds light on the marginalisation of ASM activities in Mongolia, a sector which, 
despite being illegal until 2010, has continued to support 20 per cent of Mongolia’s 
rural workforce. 
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You can’t just stop artisanal mining. ASM will continue 
as long as poverty persists. 
Mongolian government official, SAM conference1 
 
 
Introduction 
Mongolia’s mining riches are astounding. It is estimated that the country rests on 6,000 
deposits of 80 different minerals, notably coal, copper, gold, rare earth and iron ore.2 
Spearheaded by international donors, Mongolia’s mining regime has been highly 
successful in attracting foreign large-scale investments. In fact, the country is currently the 
construction site of what are expected to become two of the biggest mining development 
projects on Earth.  
While in recent years, large-scale mining has become the cornerstone of Mongolia’s 
development and poverty reduction narrative, there are growing tensions emerging from 
the severe socio-environmental impacts linked to the fast expansion of the sector. 
Crucially, if all eyes are currently on the large-scale sector, artisanal and small-scale mining 
(ASM), despite being illegal until 2010, continues to support 20 per cent of Mongolia’s 
rural workforce and to account for nearly 10 per cent of revenues in the country.  
Building on political economy insights, this paper explores the politics of ASM in 
the competing context of the fast-paced development of large-scale mining in Mongolia.3 
Without in any way challenging the importance of acknowledging the particularities of the 
ASM-context in Mongolia, questions are here raised about the actors involved in promoting 
specific norms for and legitimising a neoliberal mining governance in the country. Such 
context sheds new light on the marginalisation of ASM activities in the country.  
This paper is divided into four sections. In the first part, the paper presents the 
making of Mongolia’s current mining regime, one that was highly successful in its 
objective of developing the industrial side of the sector under a particular ‘investment-led’ 
framework. The second section of this paper turns to ASM and analyses how the sector has 
developed alongside the country’s large-scale sector. In turn, the paper discusses the 
process by which ASM has systematically been delegitimised and marginalised. In the last 
section of the paper, the current debate over the need to rethink the country’s mining regime 
is analysed.  
I. The Making of Mongolia’s Large-Scale Mining Sector 
While industrial mining activities were taking place across Mongolia during its 70 year 
long socialist era, Mongolia’s large-scale mining sector has only recently begun to position 
itself as a global player.4 The foundations of the legal framework, which has propelled the 
country to its current status of one of the world’s key mineral producers, were drawn in the 
early 1990s, amidst the country’s rapid transition towards a market economy. Sponsored 
by a handful of multilateral organisations, the initial ‘shock therapy’ saw the liberalisation 
of prices, the removal of trade restrictions and the privatisation of state enterprises.5  
Amidst this liberalisation, industrial mining was quickly identified as a key sector 
to generate the country’s much needed revenues. In the mid-1990s, alongside most of the 
other resource-rich countries in the region, Mongolia embarked on a reform process that 
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led to the adoption of a new mining legislation.6 The 1997 Mineral Law and later, the 
Foreign Investment Law (2002), were closely modelled on specific neoliberal norms and 
procedures, as advocated by international donors.7 These new laws sought to encourage 
foreign investments in the country’s large-scale sector. The World Bank, which was a key 
player in assisting Mongolia in adopting a new mining regime (see Table 1), observed that:  
The Bank has been supporting and nurturing the development of the regulatory framework 
for private sector led mining sector exploration and development for more than 10 years. 
During this time the focus of activities has been on establishing the legislative and fiscal 
regimes to apply to mining [...]. This work culminated in the passing of the 1997 Mineral 
Law and adoption of a reasonably competitive fiscal regime for the sector.8 
 
Table 1. World Bank Extractive Related Project in Mongolia (1991-2012)9* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Over US$1 million. 
 
Additionally, in December 2015, the World Bank’s International Financial Corporation 
and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency committed US$2,2 billion in loan and 
guarantee for the second phase of Oyu Tolgoi mine, the largest mine in the country.10 
Beyond the single case of Mongolia, and as argued by Campbell in this 
contribution, the importance of the World Bank’s overarching influence over the 
liberalisation and deregulation of mining sectors across poor indebted countries over the 
better part of the last three decades should not be understated.11 It is worth noting that the 
Extractive Industries Review (EIR), which was established in 2001 to independently 
evaluate the World Bank Group’s (WBG) involvement in extractive industries, estimated 
that under the distinct leadership of the Bank no less than 100 countries had reformed their 
laws, policies, and institutions during the 1990s.12 The EIR further stressed that ‘in line 
with WBG advice’, this new legislation, which was designed to ensure the protection of 
capital and to promote investment, successfully brought many developing countries to 
experience an investment boom in their mining, oil, and gas sectors.13  
Along the lines of the World Bank’s recommendations, resource-rich countries 
adopted new legal frameworks prioritising a specific set of liberal norms and procedures 
geared to develop mining within a specific governance framework. Gagné-Ouellet 
summarises these norms:14   
• Priority given to the private sector for mining development; 
• Priority given to mining over other types of territorial use; 
• Priority given to an exportable resource over other mineral resources; 
• Priority given to the industrial sector over artisanal and small mines; 
• Guarantees protecting mining rights. 
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In line with such neoliberal norms, Mongolia’s new mining regime sought to encourage 
foreign investors to participate in the exploration and large-scale development of 
Mongolia’s mineral riches.15 Unsurprisingly therefore, the 1997 Mining Law was regarded 
at the time as one of Asia’s most attractive mining laws to foreign investors.16 The new 
Law prioritised the transparency, security, and transferability of property rights. 
Additionally, its low taxation and royalty burdens were particularly enticing to foreign 
investors.17 Crucially, and in accordance to the World Bank’s guidelines for the sector, the 
role of the Mongolian state shifted from an ‘ultimate land owner’ to a manager/regulator 
of the sector.18 As discussed by Campbell in this special issue, this ‘stringent retrenchment 
of state’ led to a new delineation between public and private spheres of authority, 
transferring what were previously considered public responsibilities to private actors.19 
Albeit Campbell is here discussing the case of Africa, her observations resonate with the 
case of Mongolia. As argued later in this contribution, this process accounts for some of 
the failures by the Mongolian state to address some of today’s most severe socio-
environmental impacts attached to the mining sector.  
In contrast to the Law on Subsoil of 1989, the 1997 legislation, came to sever the 
links which were previously recognised between mining and the common and long-term 
public interests.20 The 1997 liberalisation marked the beginning of what was to quickly 
become a significant industrial ‘mining boom’ across the country. Urantsooj, President of 
the Mongolian Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) Center for Human Rights and 
Development, observes that the fast pace of issuance of mining licences at the time, notably 
for the gold sector, has meant that ‘almost the whole country was covered’.21 Although 
revisions to the 1997 Mining Law in 2006 came to challenge some of its most liberal 
provisions, the country quickly became one of the world’s key mineral producers. By 2012, 
Mongolia had reached the 7th position in terms of world mineral and ore production,22 
making it the centre of what the Financial Times referred to as an ‘investment bonanza’.23 
It is illustrative to note that the Gobi desert has been the construction site of what 
is projected to become the world’s largest coal mine (Tavan Tolgoi), and the third-largest 
copper and gold mine (Oyu Tolgoi). Exceeding all expectations, Mongolia’s economy was 
lifted by the mining wave and by 2011, it had jumped to a staggering 17.5 per cent, making 
it the fastest growing economy in the world at the time – nearly twice as fast as China’s.24 
From contributing close to 13 per cent of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) in 
2002, mining accounted for 30 per cent of the country’s GDP in 2012.25  
Amidst demand from China and the commodity boom, the neoliberal norms drove 
the expansion of the sector and came to legitimise an ‘investment-led’ strategy for the fast-
pace development of the mining sector. Here, the large-scale sector found its legitimacy 
not only via the approbation of international donors and other organisations,26 but also with 
the socio-economic promises attached to the booming sector. These were closely linked to 
tax contribution and employment creation. However, and as discussed in the following 
section of this paper, this investment-led model further served to delegitimise ASM in the 
country, despite the sizeable contribution of the sector to poverty reduction.    
II. The Rise of the Ninjas 
While the 1997 Mining Law decidedly twined the fate of the country’s economy to the 
industrial sector, it is telling to note that the Law completely ignored the very existence of 
ASM – the Law does not mention it once. However, and as indicative of the lack of legal 
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status of ASM activities in many countries across the Global South, despite this de facto 
illegal status, the sector had already begun to flourish in Mongolia.27 It should be noted that 
in sharp contrast to many resource-rich countries, ASM in Mongolia is a very recent 
phenomenon.28 It emerged as a direct aftermath of the ‘shock therapy’ packages embraced 
by the country in the early 1990s, amidst the country’s transition towards a market 
economy. The socio-economic impacts of the market reforms were sizeable – the GDP fell 
by approximately 20 per cent at that time.29 While unemployment had not been a problem 
before 1990, it had reached 8.7 per cent by 1994, and amidst the considerable waning of 
the country’s social welfare system, poverty levels rose steeply.30  
In addition to the country’s bumpy turn towards the market economy, a series of 
extreme weather conditions to the sudden shift towards ASM. Between 1999 and 2002, 
Mongolia saw three consecutive extremely snowy and cold winters known as zuds, which 
seriously impacted livestock.31 Between 7 and 11 million head of cattle and other livestock 
perished in the aftermath of such zuds,32 pushing rural communities into ‘extreme poverty 
and economic desperation’.33 The majority of these herders moved to the capital and/or 
turned to ASM as an economic activity of last resort.34 
It is however with the rise of gold prices that ASM established itself as a permanent 
activity in Mongolia – See Figure 1.35 Since the mid-2000s, the dwindling legal gold 
supplies and the spike in black market demand from neighbouring China have further 
contributed to heightened profits for ASM of gold in the country.36 
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Figure 1. Gold Prices (2000-2015)37 
 
 
 
 
As observed by the Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation,38 with the ensuing gold 
rush, the unemployed urban population joined the ex-herders in becoming ‘ninjas’ – a term 
colloquially used to refer to small-scale and artisanal miners operating in the country.39  
The overwhelming majority of ninjas – between 80 and 90 per cent – mine gold 
(both primary and placer),40 while the remainder mine for coal and fluorspar, as well as a 
small amount of semi-precious stones, tungsten and petrified wood.  
With its harsh winter months, ASM is more of a seasonal occupation – although by 
no means exclusively.41 Men and women – the latter represent approximately a third of the 
workforce 42  – involved in such activities include herders, farmers, students, factory 
workers, and even white-collar workers such as government officials.43 While on average, 
the sector pays much better than the Mongolian minimum wage, income from ASM 
remains particularly intermittent and volatile.44 
The sudden development of the phenomenon, as well its scale, left the country’s 
authorities in a state of shock and denial.45 Since its initial outbreaks in 1995-1996, ASM 
has spread to all but 3 of the country’s 21 provinces. While until recently, authorities have 
resolutely tried to ignore the sector’s very existence, as discussed in the following section, 
it is compelling to note that it has continued to expand alongside – and benefiting from – 
the prioritisation of the industrial sector.  
ASM in Mongolia remains controversial, a fact reflected in the attempts to estimate 
the number of the country’s ninjas.46 While some figures point towards 35,000 operating 
in the country, the actual figure is most probably closer to 100,000 people.47 Taking into 
account the fact that Mongolia’s total population is three million, the sector’s significance 
should not be understated. In fact, in rural areas, ASM is the largest generator of income 
after agriculture and accounts for 20 per cent of the total workforce.48 Moreover, these 
numbers do not account for the fact that each ninja is economically supporting three to four 
people.49 Today, according to the SDC, up to 400,000 people indirectly depend on the 
sector (13 per cent of the country).50 
III. ASM as a Nuisance 
Despite its substantial contribution to the local economy, ASM continues to be perceived 
as a nuisance. For national authorities, ASM was a temporary phenomenon51 and as such, 
most governmental initiatives have remained framed within the over-optimistic idea that if 
kept illegal, the sector would simply disappear.52 
This widespread disapproval of ASM in public opinion has overwhelmingly sprung 
from the sector’s environmental legacy, notably its impact on water and land, not 
withstanding the widespread use of mercury until it was made illegal in 2008.53 Corollary, 
relations between herders and ninjas have grown to be increasingly testing, with complaints 
linked to the deterioration of subsoil; livestock falling into the holes dug by miners, dried 
up rivers and springs; and water pollution. It is however important to stress that to a large 
extent, this environmental footprint derives from the fact that the sector had been kept 
illegal. Purevjav observes that ninjas have been struggling to implement environmentally 
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friendly practices in relation to rehabilitation of degraded land due to their lack of access 
to knowledge, financial resources, and technological capacity.54 
Tensions have also been noted between ninjas and the industrial sector. In a 2006 
working paper, the World Bank observed that while initially large-scale operators tolerated 
the presence of informal miners if their activities were confined to the waste tailings, tacit 
understandings quickly broke down.55 SDC further notes that: 
The industrial mining sector has long seen ASGM [Artisanal small-scale gold mining] as an 
annoyance and depicted artisanal miners as villains, irresponsibly “destructing” mineral 
deposits and the environment, and opposing against modern mechanized mining. In areas 
where LSM [large-scale mining] works, ASGM is often either a traditional activity or 
artisanal miners had discovered the gold deposits. There are abundant cases – where these 
deposits turned out to be outcrops of a larger mineralization – where ASGM was 
subsequently displaced by LSM companies. Concession areas for LSM are often 
significantly larger than the area actually required for the mining operation, sometimes 
covering thousands of square kilometres. Such areas limit the possibilities of artisanal miners 
to do ASGM formally, and even on community land where ASGM had been a traditional 
activity, miners are often considered illegal and criminal invaders.56 
In such an illegal environment, ninjas have been living on the edge of society, lacking 
security, knowledge, and skills to sustain their activity, as well as lacking a much-needed 
access to health care and social protection. This closely resonates with Hall, Hirsch and 
Murray Li’s work on the concept of exclusion,57 which they see as structured by power 
relations, whether related to regulation, force, the market or legitimation.58  
In the Mongolian case, and as argued in this contribution, one can clearly observe 
that regulations have indisputably	 favoured the industrial sector. In a de facto state of 
illegality, ASM workers have been the subject of use of force by both private and public 
security forces. The SDC report instances of ‘police and military raids, direct confrontation, 
arrests and trials with – in some cases – rampant violations of human rights’.59 In terms of 
structured power relations linked to the market, ninjas have a limited access to information 
and means to sell gold via legal channels. Here the ‘ger shop’,60 or the mill or truck owners 
have become the only accessible source of financial service for ninja miners, as well a 
convenient venue to sell the gold – mining sites are often far from financial institutions and 
Ulaanbaatar. Most middlemen then illegally sell the gold to Chinese or South Korean 
markets.61 In 2002, in order to curb these illegal channels, the Mongol Bank (the central 
bank) commenced purchasing gold at the world price from ASM directly and from gold 
buyers as private individuals. However, illegal channels have remained rampant. 
Finally, and keeping with Hall, Hirsch and Murray Li’s approach to the concept of 
exclusion, 62  while large-scale mining activities in Mongolia have rapidly become 
‘legitimate’, ASM has been systematically marginalised. In addition to its inability to 
mirror the scale of the economic promises of the industrial sector, ASM has lacked 
legitimacy in public opinion due to its historical environmental footprint across the country. 
Other factors contributing to the negative image of the sector are notably issues of child 
labour on ASM sites, tax evasion, rise in crime, and additional pressure on local 
administrations.63 High observes that for Mongolians living in the capital of Ulaanbaatar 
‘ninja mining is commonly regarded as an economic phenomenon driven by poverty and 
desperation’ and that such activities are considered to be ‘a blemish, if not an 
embarrassment’.64 It is illustrative to note that throughout the 2000s, and to a certain extent 
still today, the terms ‘ninjas’, ‘informal’ and ‘artisanal’ all appear to mean ‘illegal’ mining.  
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Unsurprisingly therefore, the government of Mongolia has long been cautious in 
proposing any legislation in regard to the legalisation of the sector ‘for fear of being 
perceived as supporting a sector that remains so unpopular with the public’.65 However, and 
as discussed in the following section, recent initiatives have began to emphasise the socio-
economic benefits of the sector and argue for the legalisation of ASM.  
IV. The Legalisation of ASM 
In light of the importance played by ASM in rural economic development, employment 
creation, and poverty reduction, the Mongolian state, in collaboration with NGOs and 
international organisations, began to study regulatory options in the early 2000s.66  
Here, it should be noted that this greater openness on the part of authorities to 
discuss ASM inscribed itself in important changes across the large-scale mining sector in 
the mid-2000s. In 2006, in a move that came to curb some of the most liberal provisions 
embedded in the 1997 Mining Law, the 1997 Mining Law was amended. The amendment 
sought to increase tax rates and state ownership over minerals, stipulating that in the cases 
of exploitation of minerals of ‘strategic importance’, the State would claim up to 34 per 
cent (Art. 5.5). 67  While the World Bank was quick to condemn the adoption of the 
amendments as a ‘pushback’ by the state on private sector led development,68 the changes 
were significant as they conveyed the sense of unease for what was perceived as the over-
liberalisation of the large-scale sector and its correlated socio-economic and ecological 
impacts. 
As further discussed by Campbell in this special issue, while large-scale mining 
activities can deliver economic growth, the ‘investment-led model’ has often failed to 
translate into economic benefits at local levels. 69 Contrary to industrial mining, ASM: 
‘money first enters at the household level and begins to circulate from the bottom up, from 
the local to the regional and national economies’.70 Further to this, while promises of 
employment are key to the promotion of a neoliberal mining regime, it is interesting to note 
that according to the National Statistical Office of Mongolia, only 8,268 people were 
engaged in mining of metal ores in 2012, or a total of 19,217 people employed in the mining 
and quarrying sector and 61,661 people in the entire industrial division.71 This is a far cry 
from the 100,000 ASM workers – 400,000 when taking into account the people being 
indirectly supported economically by ASM activities. This is not to downplay the quality 
and security attached to the much-coveted jobs in the large-scale sector but rather to 
emphasise the false premises attached to the overwhelming focus on an investment-led 
mining regime in terms of employment.  
Further to this, and despite public opinion being focussed on environmental damage 
in the ASM sector, the investment-led model, which has privileged the industrial sector, 
had registered a serious environmental footprint. Mongolia’s Mineral Resources Authority 
admits that since the beginning of the mining boom, 4,000 hectares of land have been 
adversely affected by mining – 500 mining sites affecting 56 towns in 15 different 
provinces72 observes that: 
Companies neglected environmental standards, and fared poorly on rehabilitation. Use of 
poor technology and obsolete equipment, the tendency of placer gold mines to be located in 
river basins, the use of river water for gold extraction and putting waste into rivers resulted 
in numerous reported cases of pollution and some rivers drying up. This, combined with the 
low regulatory enforcement capacity of the government, led to environmental problems 
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which started affecting rural livestock herders as pastures and water resources became 
scarce. Many civil society groups, especially at the grassroots level, emerged in reaction to 
environmental concerns around mining, and ultimately some of these groups went beyond 
environmental issues in their quest to bring about more responsible mining practices. 
This closely resonates with Campbell’s observations in this special issue when the author 
observes that there exists a clear dichotomy introduced by norms imbedded in an 
investment-led model as it creates a distinction between the large and small scale sector 
which is somewhat removed from empirical reality.73  
In Mongolia, amidst these overall changes in the country’s mining sector, the role 
of ASM gradually began to be revisited. After all, despite operating in complete illegality, 
ASM was already supporting 15 per cent of the country’s entire population – albeit 
indirectly – and the sector could sizably contribute to tax revenues. 
Strikingly, the recent changes in the perception of the sector overwhelmingly derive 
from the decade-long efforts initiated by the Swiss Agency for Development 
Cooperation.74 The Agency’s Sustainable Artisanal Mining Project (SAM), which began 
in 2005, played a fundamental role in introducing the concept of sustainable artisanal 
mining into public and policy dialogue.75 
Initial regulations were tentatively introduced as early as 200176 but the discussions 
over the official legislation faced insurmountable implementation problems over the better 
part of the following decade – mostly due to a lack of adequate consultation of the ninjas 
themselves.77  
In December 2010, the formal approval of Resolution 308 marked the official 
legalisation of ASM.78  The legalisation of ASM in 2010 was hailed by the NGO the 
Mongolian Artisanal Miners’ United Umbrella Association (MASM) as ‘the first 
progressive step toward formalization of SSM’.79 With the 2010 Law, the government was 
recognising the rights of ASM to work, mine land, and organise themselves into official 
partnerships. 80  The legislation stipulates that miners must organise in ‘unregistered 
partnerships’ of no less than five members in order to engage in mining, which are 
regulated by local administrations and limited to areas not yet licensed for exploration and 
exploitation. 81  In other words, the new legal provision gives artisanal miners the 
opportunity to scale up their activities into more formalised small-scale mining, to have a 
plot of land upon which to legally mine – provided that: i) deposits are of no commercial 
value for industrial exploitation; ii) deposits are already exploited waste deposits that have 
been abandoned and left as waste; and iii) the company and local authorities have mutually 
agreed to allow ASM work to take place.  
With the newly found land rights, the legalisation of the sector gives ninjas the 
confidence to invest in technological improvements and workplace safety, resulting in 
‘better health, lesser accidents, higher productivity and secured livelihoods’.82 It has also 
encouraged much needed training for the sector, as 90 per cent of the workers are ‘non-
professionals’.83 Furthermore, access to social services has become a noticeable benefit of 
the legalisation of the sector. The Law stipulates that the Soum [district] governor is 
responsible for taking ‘measures to provide health care and social welfare services to small-
scale miners, and access to schools and kindergartens to their children’. In terms of 
environmental practices, the formalisation of the sector and the availability of mercury-
free technological alternatives have led to what the SDC refer to as ‘excellent progress’.84   
A year after the enactment of the legalisation, 317 new partnerships had been 
established and 65.6 per cent of their members were enrolled in health insurance and 21.2 
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per cent in social insurance.85 By December 2015, 7,325 people had formally registered in 
the sector, 30 per cent of who were women.86 It is to be noted that the annual income of 
these workers was a staggering 300 per cent above the country’s minimum wage.87 
However, despite such rise in the number of partnerships, the SDC estimates that 
89 per cent of ASM activities still remain informal (as of 2015).88 According to the SDC, 
this is mostly due to ninjas’ reluctance to pay taxes and a lack of access to viable land for 
the miners.89  
However, in addition to a range of projects currently unfolding to further support 
the formalisation of the sector90, the Mineral Resource Authority of Mongolia’s recent 
increase in allocation of ASM mining land will substantially expand the possibilities for 
formalisation in the sector. 91 In fact, between 2013 and 2014, ASM gold sales rose by 115.2 
per cent, validating what the SDC refers to as ‘the immense economic potential of ASM 
when systems and mechanisms for formalization are in place to fully realize that 
potential’.92 Furthermore, amidst the current economic downturn caused by the decrease of 
world prices and the decline of China’s demand for minerals, the legalization process of 
ASM has allowed for the sector to make what the SDC refers to as “a tangible contribution” 
to the economy.93 In 2015, the sector sold 6.7 tonnes of gold to the Bank of Mongolia – 
almost half (46.3 per cent) of total gold-mining sales in the country.94 This represents USD 
245 million in foreign exchange earnings and USD 6.1 million in royalties.95  
Conclusion 
Promoted by international donors such as the World Bank, the investment-led mining 
framework adopted by Mongolia has been highly efficient in attracting large-scale 
investments in the country. However, and as argued in this paper, while ASM has long 
been overshadowed by the socio-economic promises of this investment-led regime, there 
is a need to revisit the origins of the country’s regulatory mining framework to understand 
the legitimisation process which has led to the very adoption of such framework.  
This process sheds light on the existence of relations of power – relations in which 
external actors continue to play a central role – constraining changes in the neoliberal 
norms firmly embedded in the regime. In other words, these relations of power inform the 
conditions which would permit ASM to become an integral part of the discussion over the 
role of mining activities in the country’s economy – and society a whole – rather than a 
marginalised sector. As such, in Mongolia and elsewhere, governments have begun to 
challenge some of the more liberal norms which have historically been promoted within an 
investment-led model. Here, the active role of governments in acknowledging the socio-
economic contribution of ASM is vital.  
Finally, and as also noted by Campbell in her contribution to this special issue, there 
exists a clear need to link large and small scale mining in a manner which articulates rather 
than opposes activities within the sector as a whole and crucially, in a manner that 
prioritises the entire sector’s contribution to the welfare of Mongolian people.96  
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